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Under the Supervision of Professor Joshua Spencer
Grounding physicalism is the thesis that fundamental physical truths ground every other
truth. Ted Sider and Shamik Dasgupta have recently put forward a serious challenge to
grounding physicalism. e challenge is an instance of a more general challenge con-
cerning what grounds grounding facts, which has been powerfully presented by Karen
Benne. If A is some fundamental fact about physics that grounds some fact B about
mental states, then what grounds the fact that A grounds B? e grounding physicalist
who says that such facts are either grounded or ungrounded seems to face a dilemma:
Either grounding facts are grounded and there is an innite regress of grounding facts,
or they are ungrounded and grounding physicalism is false. I reject the dilemma. I ar-
gue that grounding facts are ungrounded and that this view is consistent with grounding
physicalism. I argue that rival views that say grounding facts are grounded fail.
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Physicalism, broadly construed, may be formulated as the thesis that fundamental
physical truths – such as facts about particle positions and eld values – determine every
other truth. All God had to do was “x” the fundamental physical truths and everything
else followed.1 One recent way of understanding this formulation is to understand it as a
thesis of ground.2 ere are a variety of ways of spelling out a grounding formulation of
physicalism, but the version that I will defend in this essay is the idea that fundamental
physical truths ground every other truth. Call this view grounding physicalism. Or more
ocially:
Grounding Physicalism (GP): Every truth that is not a fundamental phys-
ical truth is grounded in a fundamental physical truth.3
Now consider the following. I just stubbed my toe on my chair and I am now in pain.
What explains my being in pain? According to the grounding physicalist, we might
give at least two types of explanations of my pain: a causal explanation or a grounding
explanation.4 A causal explanation presumably explains my being in pain by causally
1e use of the God metaphor to characterize physicalism apparently originates with Kripke (1980) p.
153-4), but has been widely used in the literature. See Crane (1991) for a prototypical case. See Hellman
and ompson (1975) for an early defense of physicalism as the view that the truths of fundamental
mathematical physics determine all other truths.
2For suggestions that physicalismmight be characterized in terms of the technical notion ‘ground’, see
Schaer (2009), Benne (2011a), Sider (2011), Fine (2012), deRosset (2013), and Stoljar (2015), among others.
For more sustained discussions, see Dasgupta (2014), Kroedel and Schulz (2016), Ney (forthcoming), and
Schaer (forthcoming). See Wilson (2014) and Melnyk (forthcoming) for some criticisms of grounding
formulations of physicalism.
3e label ‘grounding physicalism’ has also been used by at least Stoljar (2015) and Kroedel and Schulz
(2016). I will not be addressing here how my formulation of the thesis diers from others.
4Although there is a growing consensus that the grounding relation is importantly linked to explana-
tion, the relationship between ground and explanation is not entirely clear, and it is not universally agreed
upon that ground should be so linked to explanation. See Raven (2015) and Correia and Schnieder (2012)
for more discussion.
1
relating the event of the stubbing of my toe to the event of my being in pain. e special
sort of explanation the grounding physicalist has in mind, however, is some kind of non-
causal metaphysical explanation that is supposed to capture what is constitutive of pain,
or what it is to be in pain.5 We might express this laer type of explanation in a few
dierent ways. Consider the following examples:
1. I am in pain because certain neurons are ring.
2. e fact that I am in pain is grounded in the fact that certain neurons are ring.
3. e fact that I am in pain holds in virtue of the fact that certain neurons are ring.
e thought is that, in each of these sentences, the locutions ‘in virtue of’, ‘grounded in’,
and ‘because’ express a special kind of non-causal explanatory relation where a “higher
order” fact about the mental is in some sense determined by a more fundamental neu-
rophysical fact. e sense of constitutive determination involved here is also thought to
establish that the mental facts depend on neurophysical facts.
Ted Sider (2011) and Shamik Dasgupta (2014) have recently put forward a serious
challenge to GP. e challenge is an instance of a more general challenge concerning
what grounds grounding facts, which has been powerfully presented by Karen Benne
(2011a). I will present the challenge in the form of a dilemma. I present two popular
responses to the dilemma and argue that each response fails. I then oer my response to
the dilemma and then conclude. But I rst want to say some things about the structural
features of grounding explanations. Some of the features are fairly familiar and widely
discussed in the literature. For instance, many (controversially) take grounding to be a
transitive, irreexive and asymmetric relation. I assume these features hold, but I want
to focus on a feature that has not been emphasized in particular that I will call notional
priority.
5Cf. Fine (2012): “A number of philosophers have recently become receptive to the idea that, in addition
to scientic or causal explanation, there may be a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation, in which
explanans and explanandum are connected, not through some sort of causal mechanism, but through
some constitutive form of determination” (p. 37).
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Chapter 2
Grounding Explanations and Notional Priority
It seems that in grounding explanations, the explanandum (whatever is explained)
contains notions that are grounded in more fundamental notions in the explanans (what-
ever does the explaining).6 I take notions to be the constituents of facts, such as prop-
erties, events, tropes, objects, etc. Following Schaer (2009), then, I take the relata of
ground to include facts and entities of multiple ontological categories, but I try to limit
myself to emphasis on facts and properties here for maximal generality.7 In other words,
we should think of grounding as not only a relation that holds between facts, but as a
relation that holds between the notions that are the component parts of grounding facts.
In order to see what I mean, consider a structural breakdown of the following grounding
explanation.8
Explanation (E): e fact that I am in pain is grounded in the fact that my
c-bers are ring.9
Explanandum: e fact that I am in pain.
Explanans: e fact that my c-bers are ring.
For the purposes of this discussion, I am calling grounding facts like E grounding ex-
planations.10 e explanandum and explanans in a grounding explanation are the two
6See Schnieder (2006), Audi (2012), and deRosset (2013) for similar views.
7I stake no commitments here on whether ground involves one-one, many-one relations, etc.
8I follow Glazier (2016) with this presentation style.
9You might think like Wilson (2014) that if the physical realizes the mental then there is no work le
for a grounding formulation of physicalism to do. I agree with Benne (2011b), however, that realization,
understood in a certain way, is a species of grounding (or ‘building relation’ in Benne’s terms). e
dilemma I am concerned with should generalize so long as you endorse some completeness thesis to the
eect “Fundamental physical truths realize (or determine) every other truth”, such as Melnyk (2006) and
Loewer (1993), among others.
10But I will sometimes take grounding explanations to be sentences like 1-3 taken together with the
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factive parts of the explanation and stand in the grounding relation. e explanans
and explanandum each may consist in one or more facts. e explanans explains the
explanandum, but not vice versa, which is the sense in which E reects explanatory
asymmetry. In other words, if B is grounded in A, then A is not grounded in B.
But the notions contained in the explanandum and explanans of E also stand in a
grounding relation. e idea here is that the explanans contains more fundamental no-
tions than the explanandum. By fundamental I just mean ungrounded, and I take a more
fundamental notion to be a notion that is closer to an ungrounded notion in a ground-
ing chain. If you are friend to physicalism, then plausibly, pain is a less fundamental
notion than c-bers ring. So if pain is grounded in c-bers ring, then c-bers ring
is grounded in an even more fundamental notion that more immediately booms out in
an absolutely fundamental notion, i.e. the notions of particle physics.11
For example, the notion being negatively charged plausibly is not grounded in any
other notion. It is a rock-boom notion. It sits at the “ground oor” of microphysics.
e notion being an atom is not rock-boom. It is grounded in intermediate notions
that at some point boom out in ungrounded notions. In general, it is because there is
something more metaphysically basic about c-bers ring such that it grounds my being
in pain that the two facts in E reect relative priority.12 I call this general feature notional
grounding facts they express. So when I talk of bad explanations or failures of explanation in what follows,
I am really saying that certain sentences are false, or otherwise fail to “track” corresponding grounding
facts “out in the world”.
11If the minimal requirement for non-reductive physicalism is (1) mental and microphysical properties
are numerically distinct, and (2) mental properties supervene on microphysical properties, then I take
GP to be a non-reductive physicalist view. I cannot discuss here implications of my view for versions of
non-reductive physicalism that require the special sciences to be in some sense be autonomous.
12Something may be fully or partially grounded. I will sometimes alternate between full and partial
grounds. It is commonly assumed full grounds necessitate or strictly entail what they ground. I thus
accept the following principle: (P fully grounds Q)→  (P→Q). I also accept: (P fully grounds Q)→ 
(Q→P), which can be taken as a condition for dependency. e worry with the biconditional is multiple
realization, as Schaer (2013) raises for Sider’smetaphysical semantics. In reply, I just take human pain (Cf.
Lewis (1986)) to be a determinable functional property where pain is determined by dierent determinate
types of pain, such as burning pain and throbbing pain. ese variants of pain supervene on certain
variations in neural activity (e.g. c-ber stimulation in this way, c-ber stimulation in that way). We can
generalize this for a pain property that can account for the experience of pain in non-earthly creatures
such as silicon-based lifeforms. is kind of solution is recommended by Kim (1993). Putnam (1967) calls
the solution ad-hoc, but it strikes me as the most plausible account of the phenomena.
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priority, which concerns a grounding relation that holds between notions contained in
the explanans and explanandum.
On principle, then, we should say proered grounding explanations ought to reect
this feature. But it is not sucient for notional priority that it require notions in the
explanandum to be grounded in more fundamental notions in the explanans. To see
this, I want to consider one reason why we think a certain kind of explanation fails.
Consider the following:
R: e fact that a proton exists is grounded in the fact that a proton exists.
is is a bad explanation. But why? It might be argued that the problem with R is that
the notions contained in the explanans are redundant. As Benne (2011a) says, “Typical
failures of reductive explanation involve the explanans appearing, perhaps discreetly,
in the explanandum” (p. 31). True enough, but we should clarify what exactly is prob-
lematic about redundancy. Suppose for the sake of discussion two up quarks and one
down quark are bound together by gluons that are mediating the strong force interac-
tion between them. e bond gives rise to a proton. Now consider the following (partial
explanation) of the proton’s existence:
Explanation (R*): e fact that a proton exists is grounded in the fact that
a proton exists whenever certain quarks are bound together in a certain
way.
Explanandum: e fact that a proton exists.
Explanans: e fact that a proton existswhenever certain quarks are bound
together in a certain way.
R* is more explanatory than R even though the notions in the explanandum are con-
tained in the explanans. is suggests that notions in the explanans may appear in the
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explanandum so long as the explanans contain further notions that do not already ap-
pear in the explanandum. If this is right, we might formulate our requirements in terms
of the following principle as a constraint on grounding explanations:
Notional Priority (NP): eexplanandummust contain notions grounded
inmore fundamental notions in the explanans that do not appear in the
explanandum.13
We can now explain why exactly R fails to be a good explanation. e problem with R is
that it violates NP. e explanandum does not contain notions grounded in more funda-
mental notions in the explanans that do not appear in the explanandum. NP thus rules
out explanations like R, but it does not rule out all explanations where notions appear-
ing in the explanans appear in the explanandum.14 Notional priority thus captures the
Benne insight about redundancy, but helps us discriminate more clearly when and why
redundancy is problematic. Given these considerations about the structure of grounding
explanations, we can now turn back to our challenge to grounding physicalism.
13Schnieder (2006) introduces a similar view along these lines for ‘conceptual’ explanations, which can
be distinguished from metaphysical explanations that I focus on here. See Liggins (2012) for criticisms of
Schnieder’s approach. deRosset’s (2013) view is perhaps closer to my own since he understands grounding
explanations in terms of grounding facts and entity grounding, but neither seem to defend anything as
strong as the principle I am calling notional priority, which rules out various forms of redundancy and is
ultimately inconsistent with the views they defend.
14Here is a potential counterexample to NP. Suppose P obtains. It would seem that P ∨ Q is grounded
in P. In reply, I deny there are disjunctive and conjunctive facts. I distinguish between ground and truth-
making (Cf. Grith (2014)). Truth-making is a relation between sentences and facts, or representations
and facts. Metaphysical grounding is a relation between the facts that make sentences true, or between
the worldly constituents of facts that make concepts refer. e sentence ‘P ∨ Q’ is made true by the fact
that P. e sentence ‘P ∧ Q’ is made true by the fact that P and the fact that Q. We can generalize for
representational states. My belief that P grounds Q holds in virtue of the fact that P grounds Q, but where
the ‘in virtue of’ expression picks out the truth-making relation and not the metaphysical grounding
relation. Finally, I should also point out I ultimately reject explanations like R*, but for factors concerning
generalizations and laws that go beyond the scope of this essay.
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Chapter 3
A Dilemma for Grounding Physicalism
Grounding physicalism is the thesis that every truth that is not a fundamental phys-
ical truth is grounded in a fundamental physical truth.15 What is a fundamental physical
truth? Or even a physical truth for that maer? Dening a physical truth is notoriously
dicult.16 But for the purposes of this discussion, I take a physical truth to be any truth
whose notions are either (A) the fundamental notions of physics, or (B) grounded in the
fundamental notions of physics. e fact that a plant is poisonous is a physical truth be-
cause its notions are grounded in the notions of fundamental physics. And the fact that
an electron is negatively charged is a physical truth because its notions just are those of
fundamental physics. As mentioned, fundamental notions of physics are whatever the
ungrounded notions of physics are, such as being negatively charged.
It may then seem natural under these assumptions to say that a fundamental physi-
cal truth is any ungrounded physical truth (A) whose notions are those of fundamental
physics. Sider (2011) has put forward a plausible principle called ‘purity’ that requires
something to this eect. I formulate a physicalist version of the purity principle as fol-
lows:
Purity: Fundamental physical truths contain only fundamental notions of
physics.
e idea here is that fundamental physical truths, e.g. the fact that an electron is nega-
tively charged, should only contain notions of fundamental physics. If you are a friend
15We need not assume this thesis to be sucient for physicalism to generate our problem. Physicalism
may also require in addition to a grounding thesis a causal thesis about the completeness of fundamental
physical truths, which may turn on whether we take causation to be a grounding relation.
16See Montero (2001) and Ney (2008) for instances. I will not be taking up Hempel’s dilemma here, but
for now I assume current physics is what is of primary relevance to dening our terms.
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to physicalism, purity seems very plausible. e insight behind purity is best brought
out by a familiar metaphor: When God was writing the book of the world, she thought
of only fundamentally physical things. She did not write down any sentences involving
notions such as consciousness, sporting events, and democracies. As a good physicalist,
she just wrote about things like particle positions and eld values. is ts nicely with
our grounding physicalism thesis GP. We might further develop the metaphor by imag-
ining the book of the world as a kind of long recipe, specifying the basic fundamental
ingredients of nature’s stew from which all the higher level stu arises. e fundamen-
tal ingredients are put in place for everything else to follow. So once the recipe for
nature was complete and set into motion, nature’s self-organizing processes took care
of the rest. In the end, everything boils down to these basic fundamental ingredients
and nothing is over and above them.
is is the picture of grounding physicalism. Now here is the challenge. Consider
the fact that I am in pain. Given purity, the fact that I am in pain is not a fundamental
physical truth because it includes the notion pain, which is not a notion of fundamental
physics. Given GP, the fact that I am in pain must be grounded in some fundamental
physical truth. So far, this result is consistent with what any physicalist would expect.
But now consider the following grounding fact M that says this fact about my being in
pain is grounded in some rock-boom fundamental physical truth:
M: e fact that certain particles are ϕing grounds the fact that I am in
pain.17
e grounding physicalist who accepts M faces a dicult question: What, if anything,
grounds M? ere are two views here. e Grounded View and the Ungrounded View.
e Grounded View says that M is grounded in a fundamental physical truth. e Un-
grounded View says M is ungrounded. But the assumption of GP, purity, and M together
17To be clear, I am not claiming that the brain exhibits any strange quantum eects. is is just a place-
holder intended to reect the idea that our brain chemistry ismade out ofmore fundamental microphysical
stu.
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seem to generate a dilemma for anyone considering endorsing one of these views. Here
is a reconstruction of the dilemma:
(D1) EitherM is grounded in a fundamental physical truth orM is not grounded
in a fundamental physical truth.
(D2) If M is grounded in a fundamental physical truth, thenwe face a regress
of truths about ground.
(D3) If M is not grounded in a fundamental physical truth, then grounding
physicalism is false.
(D4) us, either we face a regress of truths about ground or grounding
physicalism is false.18
e Grounded View faces the rst horn of the dilemma, or the implication in premise
D2 of the argument, and the Ungrounded View faces the second horn of the dilemma,
or the implication in premise D3 of the argument.
Here is the argument for D2. Suppose M is grounded in some fundamental physical
truth. Call that truthM′. But if M′ groundsM, then what grounds the fact that M′ grounds
M? Since it includes M, that fact contains the notion pain. Given purity, it must not be
a fundamental physical truth, and given GP, it too must be grounded. Rinse, repeat, and
we end up with a regress.
Here is the argument in support of D3. Since purity banishes notions that are not
notions of fundamental physics from the fundamental physical truths, M is not a funda-
mental physical truth. It contains the notion pain. But if M is not a fundamental physical
truth, and is not grounded in anything else, then GP is false.
18is presentation of the problem is largely due to Sider (2011). Benne (2011a) and Dasgupta (2014)
present similar problems for grounding ground and GP, respectively. ere are relevant dierences be-
tween how Sider presents the problem, Benne’s dilemma, Dasgupta’s puzzle, and the dilemma presented
here, but the arguments are built out of roughly the same machinery. Benne considers in addition to
purity an argument from Schaer that appeals to a modal recombination principle. For present purposes
and in the interest of space, I must set aside my response to this objection for now and limit myself to the
objection from purity, as both Dasgupta and Sider seem to be commied to something along the lines of
purity to generate the argument against GP in particular.
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Given the dilemma, if our primary goal is saving GP, then it looks like we must take
the Grounded View and bite the bullet on the regress.19 e job of the Grounded View
then is to show that the regress is not vicious or problematic. Accepting the regress
does not guarantee that we have rescued GP, however. Indeed, I would like to show
why accepting the regress undermines GP as an explanatory thesis, or in any case, why
two popular proposals currently on oer do. It seems the only other strategy for saving
GP then is to simply reject the dilemma by denying one of its premises. One way out
of the dilemma would be to deny D2. is would require explaining why grounding M
does not commit us to a regress. I do not nd this proposed solution promising given
two of my objections to the Grounded View which do not depend on the assumption
of a regress. I will present these objections in a moment. My preferred strategy is to
take the Ungrounded View and reject D3. In particular, I suggest that we respond to the
dilemma by giving up one of its chief assumptions: the purity principle. D3 rests on the
assumption that M is not a fundamental physical truth, which is entailed by purity. If
we reject purity and can provide an alternative reading of GP, then we can reject D3. I
aim to do just that. But rst I want to present my objections to the Grounded View.
19Dasgupta (2014) does not explicitly present the challenge to GP by appeal to the purity principle,
but it seems his argument assumes something in the vicinity of purity. He says “e argument can be
formulated without reference to facts [by assuming] there is a list of sentences r expressed in a purely
physical vocabulary.” If this is not purity in the leer, then it surely is in spirit.
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Chapter 4
Objections to the Grounded View
eGrounded View strategy accepts the regress, or the implication in D2, but argues
that the regress is not problematic. is view comes in two standard responses: the
reductionist response and the connectionist response.20 e reductionist says that when
A grounds B, A grounds not only B, but also the fact that A grounds B. And with each
resulting grounding fact, the reductionist will reply that any additional grounding fact n
is still yet grounded in A. We end up with a regress, but supposedly not a vicious regress
since, in a sense, A is the ultimate ground of each regressive fact. e connectionist’s
strategy is to say M is grounded in a more general connection between the mind and
body. is general connection might be characterized in a number of ways. It may either
be an essential truth, necessary truth, conceptual truth, or a metaphysical law that facts
about mental states, for instance, are grounded in facts about microphysical states. First,
let me address the reductionist response. Here is M again:
M: e fact that certain particles areϕing grounds the fact that I am in pain.
e reductionist argues thatM is grounded in the fact that certain particles areϕing. is
response seems deeply unsatisfying. I think the reason it does is because it violates our
principle about grounding explanations. Consider the breakdown of the reductionist’s
grounding explanation of M as follows:
20See Raven (2015) for an overview of this debate. For some accounts or defenses of the reductionist
response, see Raven (2011), Benne (2011a), deRosset (2013), and Korman (2015). For the connectionist
response see Raven (2011), Rosen (2010), Fine (2012), Dasgupta (2014), and Glazier (2016).
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Explanandum: e fact that certain particles are ϕing grounds the fact
that I am in pain.
Explanans: e fact that certain particles are ϕing.
Now recall NP:
Notional Priority (NP): eexplanandummust contain notions grounded
inmore fundamental notions in the explanans that do not appear in the
explanandum.
M does not contain notions grounded in more fundamental notions in the explanans that
do not appear in the explanandum. In fact, the explanans does not contain any notions
that do not appear in the explanandum. It thus violates NP. Given NP, I think we should
reject the reductionist response.
e reductionist strategy fails for explanatory reasons, which means we still need
to explain M. How does the connectionist fare? In my estimation, probably worse. One
version of connectionism is defended by Dasgupta (2014). He prefers an essentialist
account of the connection. So return to M. Why does the fact that certain particles are
ϕing ground the fact that I am in pain? Dasgupta’s response: Because (in part) it is just
a brute fact about the essence of pain that this is so. In other words, Dasgupta says M is
grounded in the following two non-conjunctive facts:
(a) e fact that certain particles are ϕing.
(b) e fact that it is essential to being in pain that if certain particles are ϕing then
someone is in pain.
What grounds (b) – the fact about essence? Nothing. e essential connection is un-
grounded. It is simply a brute fundamental fact. Dasgupta says such facts are not “apt
for ground”. He calls this view brute essentialism.
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My rst objection to this response is that not only is it inconsistent with grounding
physicalism, it appears to give up on physicalism altogether. Note that the essential
fact (b) contains the notion pain, which given purity means that it is not a fundamental
physical truth. GP thus requires (b) to be grounded, but Dasgupta says the essential
facts lack a ground. In other words, (b) is inconsistent with GP.21 In fact, Dasgupta
is commied to a form of dualism. e dispute between physicalists and dualists is
now largely taken to be a dispute about whether or not the mental is a fundamental
feature of the world. Most physicalists take the fundamental notions to be supplied by
fundamental physics, or somehow exhausted by the vocabulary of fundamental physics,
and physics currently does not include the mental among its fundamental notions or
basic categories. If Dasgupta’s view is correct, then the essence of pain is presumably a
fundamental notion, but it is not a notion of fundamental physics.
Suppose we divide up the world between essences of things that are notions of fun-
damental physics and those essences that are not. Since the essence of something is an
ungrounded notion and thus a fundamental notion, then we have two brute kinds of
essential entities: those essential entities that are fundamentally physical and those that
are not. An argument for the brute essentiality of pain then is in eect an argument for
dualism. Any good physicalist will want to reject this thesis.
My second objection to the connectionist response concerns the commitment to a
regress. e fact about essence (b) that gures into the grounds of M is fundamental
and ungrounded. Arguably, this response is resistant to my objection from NP to the
reductionist. e brute essentialist will want to say that the essence of something is more
fundamental than anything already contained in the explanandum. But what about the
fact that M is grounded in (a) and (b)? What grounds that fact? Dasgupta simply bites
the bullet here. at fact, call it U, is grounded in some further fact G, which is about,
perhaps, the essence of ground, as Dasgupta says. But the fact that G grounds U, call
21I end up rejecting purity, but I recommend a variant of purity that has this same consequence for
brute essentialism.
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that fact P, must also have a ground, and presumably no notion more fundamental than
the essence of ground will appear in those grounds. It is an absolutely rock-boom
notion. If so, then the grounds of each reiterated grounding fact will not contain more
fundamental notions than what is found in the facts they ground, which is in violation
of NP.
Alternatively, Dasgupta may claim that every grounding fact is grounded in a fact
that does contain a notion more fundamental than any notions found in what they
ground. Perhaps he will say the essence of ground in U’s ground G is a more fundamental
notion than the essence of pain in M’s ground (b). But then if P, the fact that G grounds U,
has a ground that contains some notion more fundamental than the essence of ground,
and this process continues ad innitum, then Dasgupta ends up with an innite number
of distinct fundamental notions. Very plausibly, we should limit our inventory of funda-
mental notions if we can help it, but Dasgupta’s conclusion will commit us to an inated
ideology of fundamental notions. is is a deeply unsatisfying result. It lacks the parsi-
mony and simplicity we expect from our explanations. Here is a Benne-esque picture
of Dasgupta’s grounding fact regress (where arrows indicate the grounding relation and
brackets indicate a grounding fact).22
(either more fundamental or not)
Figure 1: Dasgupta’s grounding fact regress
22Cf. gure 1 in Benne (2011a).
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My objection thus can be stated in the form of a dilemma for the brute essentialist. If
the essential facts (such as (b), G, or ) do not contain more fundamental notions than
the facts they help ground, then the brute essentialist response is in violation of NP. If
the essential facts do contain more fundamental notions than the facts they help ground,
then the brute essentialist is commied to an inated ideology. On either horn, brute
essentialism fails to be explanatorily satisfying.
Given the explanatory failures of the reductionist and connectionist response, I now
want to turn to a possible Ungrounded View reply to the dilemma. If the Grounded View
fails and the Ungrounded View seems to entail the falsity of grounding physicalism, then
what are the prospects for a grounding formulation of physicalism? Given our package
of bad options, one way the proponent of GPmight meet the challenge to their thesis and
provide a more satisfying response to the dilemma than rival views would be to show
that their view (i) does not violate NP, (ii) limits the number of fundamental notions
that appear in one’s overall account of grounding facts, and (iii) is consistent with GP. I
would like to suggest that the Ungrounded View can potentially provide the path toward
such a view. is move involves giving up on purity, which is an intuitively plausible
principle, but I will argue that this is no mark against the view if purity can be replaced




Prospects for an Ungrounded View
In response to the question of what grounds M, the Ungrounded View says that
nothing grounds M. But if M is not a fundamental physical truth, then M must have a
ground if grounding physicalism is true. e Ungrounded View’s response thus seems
like an untenable move if you are a grounding physicalist. My response is to reject the
claim that M is not a fundamental physical truth. It is the assumption of purity that
commits us to this claim, but it is an assumption I think we can give up on without any
explanatory cost. I think we canmaintain the spirit of purity by endorsing a distinctively
grounding variant of the purity principle in its stead:
Pure grounds: Fundamental physical truths that ground other truths con-
tain only fundamental notions of physics.
Pure grounds requires that any notion that enters into a fundamental physical fact that
grounds another fact – or, in other words, anything that gures into the scope of the
ungrounded explanans of a grounding fact – must be a fundamental notion of physics.
In slogan form, fundamental grounds in grounding facts must be pure. So if the fact that
certain particles are ϕing is a fundamental physical truth that grounds the fact that I
am in pain, then pure grounds requires these grounds to contain fundamental notions.
e fact that certain particles are ϕing must consist in fundamental notions, but unlike
purity, pure grounds does not require the explanandum in a grounding fact to consist in
fundamental notions.
e idea here is that our “structural foundations” or “basic building blocks” are pure.
Or, to exploit the metaphor, when God was preparing the basic ingredients for nature’s
stew, she thought of reality in its purest form and specied the ingredients in completely
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fundamental terms. She did not think of things like mental states and sporting events,
but only of things like particle positions and eld values. But our God is all knowing,
and she was aware that all of the complexity in nature would arise out of these basic
fundamental ingredients. Grounding facts are like instructions in a recipe book, speci-
fying where the fundamental ingredients go and how everything ultimately ts together
in connection to them.23
Pure grounds is a nice principle since it seems like a natural extension of NP. We
should expect that as the explanans becomes more and more fundamental, it will bot-
tom out in completely fundamental notions. We hit rock-boom at the fundamental
foundations of physics. Pure grounds also allows the Ungrounded View to be consistent
with grounding physicalism. Grounding physicalism says fundamental physical truths
ground every other truth, and since M is ungrounded, M must be a fundamental phys-
ical truth. I accept this result. Recall that I take a physical truth to be any truth whose
notions are either (A) the fundamental notions of physics, or (B) grounded in the funda-
mental notions of physics. M meets this condition. Its notions are those of fundamental
physics and those grounded in notions of fundamental physics. It is thus a physical
truth, and since it is an ungrounded truth, it is a fundamental physical truth. If one is in-
clined toward the view that explanations should end somewhere, then terminating with
fundamental physics, and facts about the explanatory priority of fundamental physics,
seems like a good place to stop.
Finally, pure grounds helps accommodate one of the key commitments of physi-
calism that the mental is not fundamental, because it forbids the mental from being a
“building block” or “fundamental ingredient” of nature. e fundamental ingredients of
nature are provided by fundamental physics. If one insists that pain is a fundamental in-
gredient, then one has given up on physicalism, since it admits of fundamental mentality
in a way that is in tension with (at least current) fundamental physics.
23For instance, a recipe for a cake includes instructions about each stage in the process and information
about how best to enjoy the nal product. anks to Joshua Spencer for this suggestion.
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Another way of thinking about this, which helps get at what is special about ground-
ing facts, is to point out that grounding facts are not themselves building blocks or ingre-
dients for anything. ey do not ground anything. In other words, they are not them-
selves foundational. Take the grounding physicalist thesis for instance: Every truth that
is not a fundamental physical truth is grounded in a fundamental physical truth. Noth-
ing further grounds this fact and it grounds nothing further. We should not expect a fact
that reports the explanatory completeness of fundamental physics to be grounded in
anything else nor for it to ground anything else. It is explanatorily complete. It explains
nothing further than what it describes, which reports the fundamental structure of real-
ity. Grounding facts are thus only “fundamental” in the sense that they are ungrounded,
but they are not fundamental in the sense of being “the basic ingredients out of which
everything arises”. ey do not “make the world”. As in our cooking metaphor, they
are merely the rules or instructions that explain how the world is structured and pre-





I have argued that that since pure grounds is as plausible as purity, then we can re-
ject the claim that M is not a fundamental physical truth. Given pure grounds, it does
not follow that if M is not grounded in a fundamental physical truth, then grounding
physicalism is false. is is because M is a fundamental physical truth and ground-
ing physicalism does not require fundamental physical truths to be grounded. I thus
recommend that we reject D3 of our dilemma, thereby blocking this particular chal-
lenge to grounding physicalism. To clarify, my only aim here has been to remove one
challenge to someone who is a proponent of grounding physicalism, i.e. the challenge
posed by this dilemma. As Dasgupta notes, we may have other objections to grounding
physicalism, perhaps based on more general considerations about qualia, conceivabil-
ity arguments, or the knowledge argument, but if I am right, then we should not reject
grounding physicalism on the basis of the claim that M is not a fundamental physical
truth as a consequence of our commitment to the purity principle.
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